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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Masonic Mut. Aid Ass'n, 126 N. Y. 450, 454, 27 N. E. 942, 943 (1891).
But see Atchinson, T. and S. F. R. Co. vA Reesman, 60 F. 370, 373
(1894). Without the ability to find the facts, legislative investigations
are of little help in preparing intelligent statutes. The privilege shields
from inquiry the very abuse concerning which the public is entitled to
full information. See People ex rel Wood v. Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43,
49, 1 N. E. 599, 600 (1855) ; City Bank F. T. Co. v. N .Y. C. R. R. Co.,
253 N. Y. 49, 57, 170 N. E. 489, 492 (1930).
J.E.K.
INSURANCE
COVERAGE OF AUTO THEFT POLICY
In two recent cases an automobile was taken without the consent
of the owner by a person in temporary possession, but without the
intent to keep it permanently. Each automobile was insured against
theft. The Indiana Supreme Court denied recovery on the insurance
policy for damages to the car, but a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
allowed recovery.'
The Indiana court followed the weight of authority and defined
theft as synonymous with larceny, requiring the common law intent
to appropriate another's property wholly and permanently.2 The
Federal court allowed recovery, holding that an appropriation incon-
sistent with the property right of the person from whom it was taken
was sufficient.
The general rule in construing insurance contracts is that if the
language is ambiguous or reasonably open to two constructions, the one
most favorable to the insured will be adopted.3 The application of the
rule would include "taking without consent" cases within the coverage
of theft policies. 4
Where state statutes make, vehicle taking a felony but do not
require an intent to permanently deprive, courts generally consider
such taking unprotected by theft policies.5 These cases follow the
1 Home Insurance Co. v. Mathis, 32 N. E. (2d) 108 (Ind. App. 1941);
Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corp. v. Aldridge, 117 F. (2d) 774
(App D. C. 1941).
2 Hartford Ins. Co. v. Wimbish, 12 Ga. App. 712, 78 S. E. 265 (1913);
Michigan Comm. Ins. Co. v. Wills, 57 Ind. App. 256, 106 N. E.
725 (1914); Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239
N. Y. 303, 146 N. E. 432 (1923); note (1931) 89 A. L. R. 466.
5 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U. S. 167 (1923);
Stroehman v. Mutual Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 435 (1937). The reason
for such rule is that the insurer can remedy the ambiguity by
inserting an exception in the policy. Allen v. Berkshire Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 105 Vt. 471, 168 Atl. 698 (1933).
4 James v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 209, 225 Pac. 213 (1924); Globe
& Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. House, 163 Tenn. 585, 45 S. W. (2d) 55
(1932); Thomas Investment Co. v. Thompson, 32 S. W. (2d)
708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
5 Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 303, 146
N. E. 432 (1923); Repp v. American Farmer's Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co., 179 Minn. 167, 228 N. W. 605 (1930); LaMotte v. Re-
tail Hdw. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 41, 233 N. W. 566 (1930).
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rule which defines theft under the insurance contract as "theft as
common thought and common speech would now image and describe
it."6 A contrary result is reached by some courts on the ground that
statutes have broadened the crime of larceny by expressly making
certain acts, larceny which did not contain all of the common law
elements.7
The Indiana court defines felonious intent as the common law
understood it. Taking an automobile temporarily without the consent
of the owner, therefore, is not theft8 even though a more severe
punishment is meted out to the wrong-doer than in grand larceny.9
The Federal court reconciles the statutes with the common law definition
and holds, use inconsistent with the property interest of the owner is
included within the theft clause.
A strict application of the common law seems to justify the
Indiana decision. However, in view of the rule of interpretation favor-
ing the insured as well as the statutory changes of intent in larceny,
the more modern view of the Federal court is to be commended.
A.M.H.
LABOR LAW
LABOR INJUNCTION AND FREE SPEECH
Union coal miners peacefully picketed a coal mine in an effort to
procure employment at the union wage scale. Meanwhile, non-union
miners negotiated a lease contract under which they operated the
mine, the owner receiving a flat price per ton. The trial court
granted the non-union miners an interlocutory order enjoining the
picketing. Held, reversed. An injunction against peaceful picketing
violates the right of free speech guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
tion. Davis v. Yates, 32 N.E. (2d) 86 (Ind. 1941).
6 Cardozo, J., in Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239
N. Y. 303, 146 N. E. 432, 433 (1923). Cases, however, differ
widely as to what "common speech" would mean as theft. Note(1931) 89 A. L. R. 466.
7 Nugent v. Union Automobile Ins. Co., 140 Ore. 61, 13 P. (2d) 343(1932) (larceny by trick); Brady v. Norwich Union Fire Ins.
Soc., 47 R. I. 416, 133 Atl. 799 (1926) (false pretenses); Southern
Casualty Co. v. Landry, 266 S. W. 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)
(larceny by bailee); N. Y. PENAL LAW (1939) § 1290; ANN. LAWS
OF MASS. (1933) c. 266, § 30; 6 BERRY, LAW OF AUTOMOBILES (7th
ed. 1935) § 6.586.
But see Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Garage, 85 Ind. App.
674, 155 N. E. 533 (1926). In suit by insurer of owner of car
against garage for acts of employee in taking car and wrecking
it, the lower court cites the Indiana statute on vehicle taking and
states, "And a person who violates this statute and is thereafter
convicted and punished in accordance with its provisions may
very properly be said to be guilty of stealing an automobile, and
in referring to his act, it would be proper to say he stole an
automobile, or that, in so doing he committed a theft."
9 IND STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 10-3001 (grand larceny-punishable
by imprisonment from 1 to 10 years); id. § 10-3010 (vehicle taking
-first offense punishable by imprisonment from 1 to 10 years
and second offense from 3 to 10 years).
